

Does gender diversity in boardrooms influence corporate performance and growth? Evidence from India

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Abstract

This study aims to look into how company performance and growth in India are affected by board gender diversity. Top 20 NSE-listed Indian companies throughout a five-year period, from 2016–17 to 2021–22, have been chosen as a sample. After adjusting for the upshot of Firm size, AGE, and Leverage, the upshot of the multiple regression analysis show that board gender diversity exerts a favourable and substantial sway in explaining corporate success. Additionally, the estimations demonstrate that the sway of board gender diversity on corporate growth is both favourable and large. These uncovering suggest that board gender diversity is essential for achieving corporate growth as well as bettering Indian companies' financial performance.

Keywords: Board Gender Diversity, Female Directorship, Firm's Performance, Corporate growth, Control Variables, India

JEL Classification: L10, L20, L25, M10, M14

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Introduction:

Boards of Directors are an essential component of a business with higher authority and obligations. They are occupied with running the business and preserving the heed of the shareholders. More concretely, the board of directors play crucial roles in making decisions and delegating authority to achieve the company's goals while ensuring that the management is acting on their behalf. They also set strategic direction, supervise and control all executive managers, create rules to govern and manage the corporation, hire senior managers, link the company to the exterior world, and provide facts. The board of directors is one of the crucial internal corporate governance control mechanisms in the organisation thanks to these activities (**Campbell & Miguez-Vera, 2008**). The Board of Directors, and in particular, its decisions and actions, heavily influence whether firms succeed or fail.

Effectiveness and how well the organisation executes on key parameters, often financial, market, and shareholder performance, serve as indicators of an organization's overall performance (**Wigmore, 2015**). Gender diversity is a topic that has recently received a lot of heed from a variety of groups, plus governments, trade, scholastic and the extensive public (**Kilic & Kuvay, 2016**). One of the possible drivers of increased business performance and growth, according to some experts, is gender diversity in boardrooms. Due to the fact that gender diversity tends to bring diverse perspectives and viewpoints to the board and creates a space for creativity, it eventually brings new energy to the boardrooms, improves the environment, and produces a board of directors that works well to safeguard the heed of the shareholders.

There has been an emerging trend to promote greater diversity inside organisations around the world in response to social and cultural changes in society (**Srinivasan, 2013**). India has accepted the mandated strategy for

gender diversity in boardrooms, making it no exception. director under section 149(1) who is female. Also, they may be appointed to the company as an independent, non-executive, or executive director. Some classifications of corporations are indispensable to have at least one woman director, according to the 2013 Companies Act. Also, they may be appointed to the company as an independent, non-executive, or executive director. Clause 49 of the listing agreement, which is go round by the Securities and Exchange Board of India, affirm that the Board of Directors of the Company shall have optimal blend of executive and non-executive directors, with at least one woman director and not less than fifty percentage of the Board of Directors be made up of non-executive directors. With effect from April 1, 2015, the provisions respecting the electing of women directors as affirm in Article 49 (II)(A)(1) shall be in force.

But, at the moment, there is very little diversity in Indian boardrooms. The absence of female directors at many corporations is the logical reason for this phenomenon. It's important to note that only 8.9% of directors at Indian corporations were women, according to current statistics. According to data collected by NSE and Prime Database, there are currently 10,185 men serving as directors in the approximately 1,468 Indian firms that are listed on the NSE, and only 908 women.

In terms of the outlook of women in boardrooms worldwide, 12% of the directorships of significant German firms are held by women. In Canada, there must be a 50% female rendition on the 14 Crown Corporations' boards of directors. In China, 35.3% of the board posts of China Construction Bank are held by women. According to World Bank data, women were among the major proprietors of 34% of Lebanese businesses. According to recent statistics, women hold more than 24% of top executive positions in Brazil. In South Africa, women held 16.4% of the directorships in the 335 enterprises assessed.

The Institute of Directors in Luxembourg, which has 400 members, has about 13% female members. In Malaysia, women hold 30% of corporate

leadership roles. Among 303 publicly listed firms, including our neighbour Pakistan, more than 13% had multiple female directors.

Literature review:

According to **Adams and Ferreira (2009)**, having more women on board has a big footprint on how well a company performs because they are better at managing meetings, have different perspectives than men, and are better leaders than men (**Huse and Solberg 2006**). Nonetheless, since there aren't any women directors in nearly 20% of the largest firms in the world, women continue to be underrepresented on boards and in other top management roles (**Desvaux, et al., 2010**). The edge of having more women on board are many and differing. 1st, having added women on boards can refine corporate governance, which will improve business performance (**Alabede, 2016**). This finding was corroborated by Adams and Ferreira (2009), who claimed that women have a significant influence on corporate governance because they are more committed to take part in meetings and that men are added willing to increase their participation when there are women directors. **Daniel et al. (2015)** established Adams and Ferreira's (2009) results that having more female board members had a beneficial impact on business performance as dignified by return on value (ROE). Second, having a diverse board of directors is crucial for enhancing a company's honor since having women on the board of directors conveys to the public that there are no discrimination issues at the company (**Kaur & Singh, 2017**). Lastly, as reported by **Arguden (2012)**, women are well able to anticipate consumer needs, which gives them the capacity to create products and services that are successful. As a result, between 70% and 80% of consumer buying decisions are driven by women in Europe and the US, respectively. Fourth, businesses with women in high positions are more likely to succeed because they hire people based on their skills rather than their demographic characteristics. Also, as they view women in powerful positions as example, female employees will put in extra effort and record higher fruitfulness to advance (**Lückerath-Rovers, 2013**). Finally, women contribute fresh perspectives and groundbreaking ideas that advance the formulation of policy. Yet, their

communication and ease in gathering information from many sources may bring value to problem solving (Sánchez, 2017). The more women and independent directors there are on a board, the more diversified the board is, and the more successfully the directors do their monitoring, controlling, and auditing duties, which benefits the firm (**Woschkowiak, 2018**). Female directors offer fresh perspectives and credentials that differ from those of the "old boys' club" (**Bennouri, et al., 2018**). On the other side, there may be some pessimistic upshot for businesses from the trend of added women in leadership positions. Hence, presence of women on the board of directors would have a gloomy effect on the performance of the company, which was justified by the fact that it would take longer to make decisions on boards with more diversity (Smith, et al., 2006). However, board diversity foisttoo costs on the company, and any improvement in the performance of the company may not be sufficient to offset those higher values (**Marinova, et al., 2016**).

Objective of the study:

Examining how gender diversity in boardrooms affects business financial performance and growth is the main goal of this work. The goals of the current work are more specifically as follows:

- 1) To examine the trend towards gender diversity in Indian boardrooms following the 2013 Companies Act's passage.
- 2) To investigate how gender diversity in Indian business boardrooms affects financial success.
- 3) To investigate how gender diversity in boardrooms affects corporate development in India.

Hypotheses development:

Following the establishment of the study's goals, the following potential hypotheses will be tested:

H01: There are no significant tie-in-between proportion of female director on board and corporate financial performance.

H02: There are no significant tie-inbetwixt total female director on board and corporate financial performance.

H03: There are no significanttie-inbetwixt proportion of independent female director on board and corporate financial performance.

H04: There are no significanttie-inbetwixt proportion of female director on board and corporate growth.

H05: There are no significanttie-inbetwixt total female director on board and corporate growth.

H06: There are no significanttie-in betwixt proportion of independent female director on board and corporate growth.

Research design & methodology:

Study nature:

Current investigation is based on descriptive and empirical in nature.

Sample:

Using a convenient/purposive sampling technique, an illustrative of the top twenty NSE-listed firms has been chosen. Since the banking and financial sectors have distinct financial features, they have been left out of the study.

Table 1: Selection of sample

No. of companies primarily selected	29
Less: No. of banks	5
Less: No. of financial companies	4
Final Sample Size	20

Period of the study

The time period covered by the current study is five years, from 2016–17 to 2021–22. According to COVID-19, the most recent fiscal year, 2020–21, was most definitely not a typical operating year and was thus left out of the study's time span.

Data source

From the yearly reports of the corporations that were retrieved from www.moneycontrol.com, a secondary source, all the necessary financial information was acquired and collated. Also, additional pertinent data and information required to build the conceptual framework of this study was acquired from various publications, books, and periodicals.

Methodology

The current study relies on descriptive statistics, specifically the mean and standard deviation, to assess the gender diversity trend in Indian boardrooms following the passage of the Companies Act, 2013. Next, we use Pearson's correlation analysis to look for multi-co-linearity. Lastly, using multiple regression analysis, the upshot of gender diversity in boardrooms on business financial performance and growth is looked at. More specifically, the current study has used all six of the following regression models:

Model (1) look into the impact of proportion of female director on board on corporate financial performance.

$$\mathbf{CFP}_{it} = \beta_1 + \beta_2 PFDOB1_{it} + \beta_3 FS2_{it} + \beta_4 FAGE3_{it} + \beta_5 LEV4_{it} + \epsilon_i \dots \dots \dots \mathbf{Model (1)}$$

Model (2) look into the upshot of number of female directors on board on corporate financial gig.

$$\mathbf{CFP}_{it} = \beta_1 + \beta_2 TFDOB1_{it} + \beta_3 FS2_{it} + \beta_4 FAGE3_{it} + \beta_5 LEV4_{it} + \epsilon_i \dots \dots \dots \mathbf{Model (2)}$$

Model (3) look into the upshot of proportion of female executive directors on board on

corporate financial gig.

$$\mathbf{CFPit} = \beta_1 + \beta_2 \mathbf{PFIDOB1it} + \beta_3 \mathbf{FS2it} + \beta_4 \mathbf{FAGE3it} + \beta_5 \mathbf{LEV4it} + \epsilon_i \dots \dots \dots \mathbf{Model (3)}$$

Model (4) look into the upshot of proportion of female director on board on corporate

growth.

$$\mathbf{CGit} = \beta_1 + \beta_2 \mathbf{PFDOB1it} + \beta_3 \mathbf{FS2it} + \beta_4 \mathbf{FAGE3it} + \beta_5 \mathbf{LEV4it} + \epsilon_i \dots \dots \dots \mathbf{Model (4)}$$

Model (5) look into the upshot of number of female directors on board on corporate growth.

$$\mathbf{CGit} = \beta_1 + \beta_2 \mathbf{TFDOB1it} + \beta_3 \mathbf{FS2it} + \beta_4 \mathbf{FAGE3it} + \beta_5 \mathbf{LEV4it} + \epsilon_i \dots \dots \dots \mathbf{Model (5)}$$

Model (6) look into the upshot of proportion of female executive directors on board on

corporate growth.

$$\mathbf{CGit} = \beta_1 + \beta_2 \mathbf{PFIDOB1it} + \beta_3 \mathbf{FS2it} + \beta_4 \mathbf{FAGE3it} + \beta_5 \mathbf{LEV4it} + \epsilon_i \dots \dots \dots \mathbf{Model (6)}$$

Variables of interest

The first target variable (target variable), corporate financial gig, is assessed using return on asset (ROA), while the second objective variable, corporate growth, has been proxied using growth in sales %. Three variables—the percentage of female directors on the board, the total number of female directors on the board, and the percentage of female independent directors on the board have been used to represent the explanatory variable (independent variable) of board gender diversity. Lastly, in order with earlier investigation, we take business size, firm age, and leverage into account.

Table 2: research variables

SL.NO.	Variables of Interest	Measurement
1.	Dependent Variable: a) Corporate Financial Performance (CFP)	a) $ROA \% = EBIT / TotalAssets \times 100$
	b) Corporate Growth (CG)	b) $Change\ in\ Sales\ \% = \frac{Current\ year\ Sales - Previous\ year\ Sales}{Previous\ Sales} \times 100$
2.	Independent Variable: a) Gender Diversity on Board	(i) Prop. Of Female Director on Board (PFDOB) = $\frac{Female\ Director\ on\ Board}{Total\ Director\ on\ Board}$.
		(ii) Total No. of Female Directors on Board (TFDOB)
		(iii) Prop. Of Female Independent Directors on Board (PFIDOB) = $\frac{Female\ Independent\ Director\ on\ Board}{Total\ Director\ on\ Board}$
3.	Control Variable: a) Firm Size (FS)	FS = Natural log of firm's total asset.
	b) Firm Age (AGE)	FAGE = No. of years from the date of incorporation.
	c) Leverage (LEV)	LEV = $\frac{Debt}{Equity}$

Data analysis and findings:**Descriptive statistics**

Table 3 Descriptive Statistics					
Variables	N	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Deviation
CFP	100	.00	2.15	.1865	.33585
CG	100	-.13	.83	.1712	.14626
TFDOB	100	.00	5.00	1.9900	1.05883
PFDOB	100	.00	.36	.1800	.08885

PFIDOB	100	.00	.30	.1499	.07415
FS	100	8.63	14.22	11.2080	1.29286
FAGE	100	16.00	157.00	56.0100	32.46210
LEV	100	.00	2.20	.4339	.56824
Valid N (listwise)	100				

The above Table 3 foreground descriptive statistics of the key variables and some control variables used in the present evaluation. It can be spot from the above table that the present analysis has 100 no. of utterance. The mean value of the pivotal response variables videlicet TFDOB, PFDOB, PFIDOB is 1.990, .180 and .149 respectively. The other explanatory variables which are control variables FS, AGE and LEV has a mean value 11.208, 56.010 and .434 respectively, while the mean value of label variable CFP and CG are .186 and .171 respectively.

Table 4 Correlation analysis

Variables	CFP	CG	TFDOB	PFDOB	PFIDOB	FS	AGE	LEV
CFP	1							
CG	0.080	1						
TFDOB	0.087	0.086	1					
PFDOB	.328**	0.090	.893**	1				
PFIDOB	.448**	0.116	.640**	.799**	1			
FS	.412**	.289**	.302**	.373**	-.387**	1		
FAGE	-0.107	-0.173	.247*	-0.018	-.202*	-.291**	1	
LEV	-.313**	0.144	.235*	.278**	-.289**	.474**	.375**	1

Source: Author's own tabulation using SPSS 20 software

***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).*

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*

The above disclosed Table 4 put stress on the relationship between dependent and independent variables. The predictor variable CFP has a positive and significant alliance with PFDOB and PFIDOB. This table also highlights that corporate financial performance (CFP) has appositve relation with TFDOB, PFDOB and FS but there are a negative relationship with AGE and also a significantly negative relationship with LEV. We also observed that corporate growth (CG) has a positive relationship with TFDOB , PFDOB , PFIDOB , LEV and a significantly positive relationship with FS but CG has a negative relationship with AGE. Moreover we found that the correlation amongst all the selected explanatory variables is minimal i.e. below 0.80, this signifies no multi co linearity problem lies among the predictor variables used in the study.

Multiple regression analysis:

Table 5 (model 1)

Variables	No. Of observation	Coefficient	Std. Error	T - statistic	P - value	F - statistic	P - value of f- statistic	R - square
PFDOB	100	.506	.363	1.395	.166	9.427	.000*	.284
FS	100	-.089	.027	-3.254	.002*			
FAGE	100	-.003	.001	-2.978	.004*			
LEV	100	-.131	.062	-2.122	.036*			
(CONSTANT)	100	1.310	.344	3.814	.000*			

Source: Author's own tabulation using SPSS 20 software

Dependent Variable: CFP (** significant @ 5%, * significant @ 1% significance level)

Table 5 disclosed the result of our regression model 1. Significance at 1% and 5% has been checked. The R-square value is 0.284, p-value of F-statistic is .000 which is significant at 1% level. So, we can say the model 1 is fit for the study. On the other hand, coefficient value for the predictor variable is .506 which is positive but insignificant.

Table 6 (model- 2)

VARIABLES	NO. OF OBSERVATION	COEFFICIENT	STD. ERROR	t-STATISTIC	P-value	F-STATISTIC	P-VALUE OF F-STATISTIC	R-SQUARE
TFDOB	100	.004	.030	-.130	.897	8.767	.000*	.270
FS	100	-.101	.027	-3.785	.000*			
FAGE	100	-.003	.001	-3.206	.002*			
LEV	100	-.146	.061	-2.378	.019**			
(CONSTANT)	100	1.569	.319	4.911	.000*			

Source: Author's own tabulation using SPSS 20 software

Dependent Variable: CFP (** significant @ 5%, * significant @ 1% significance level)

Table 6 disclosed the result of our regression model -2. Significance at 1% and 5% has been checked. The R-square value is 0.270, p- value of F – statistic is .000 which is significant at 1% level. So, we can say the model- 2 is fit for the study. On the other hand, coefficient value for the predictor variable is .506 which is positive but insignificant.

Table 7 (model 3)

Variables	No. Of observation	Coefficient	Std. Error	T - statistic	P - value	F - statistic	P - value of f- statistic	R - square
PFIDO B	100	1.078	.464	2.324	.022*	10.610	.000*	.309
FS	100	-.077	.027	-2.800	.006*			
FAGE	100	-.002	.001	-2.094	.039*			
LEV	100	-.109	.062	-1.763	.081			
(CONST ANT)	100	1.055	.361	2.919	.004*			

Source : Author's own tabulation using SPSS 20 software

Dependent Variable: CFP (** significant @ 5% , * significant @ 1% significance level)

Table 5 disclosed the result of our regression model- 3. Significance at 1% and 5% has been checked . The R-square value is 0.309 , p- value of F – statistic is .000 which is significant at 1% level . So we can say the model - 3 is fit for the study. On the other hand coefficient value for the predictor variable is 1.078 which is positive and also significant at 5% level as the p- value of the coefficient is 0.022.

Table- 8 (model 4)

VARIABLES	NO. OF OBSERVATION	COEFFICIENT	STD. ERROR	t - STATISTIC	P - value	F - STATISTIC	P - VALUE OF F- STATISTIC	R - SQUARE
PFDOB	100	.366	.174	2.106	.038**	3.64	.008*	.133
FS	100	.039	.013	2.992	.004*	2		
FAGE	100	.000	.000	-.586	.559			
LEV	100	.005	.030	.162	.872			
(CONSTANT)	100	-.318	.165	-1.933	.056			

Source: Author's own tabulation using SPSS 20 software

Dependent Variable: CG (** significant @ 5%, * significant @ 1% significance level)

Table 8 disclosed the result of our regression model 4. Significance at 1% and 5% has been checked. The R-square value is 0.133, p- value of F - statistic is .008 which is significant at 1% level. So, we can say the model 4 is fit for the study. On the other hand, coefficient value for the predictor variable is .366 which is positive and also significant at 5% level as the p- value of the coefficient is 0.038.

Table - 9 (model 5)

Variable	No. Of observation	Coefficient	Std. Error	T - statistic	P - value	F - statistic	P - value of f- statistic	R - square
TFDOB	100	.030	.014	2.095	.039**	3.62	.009*	.133
FS	100	.036	.013	2.834	.006*	9		
FAGE	100	-.001	.000	-1.298	.197			

LEV	100	.002	.029	-.070	.945			
(CONST ANT)	100	-.254	.152	-1.678	.097			

Source : Author's own tabulation using SPSS 20 software

Dependent Variable: CG (** significant @ 5% , * significant @ 1% significance level)

Table 9 summarizes the result of our regression model 5. Significance at 1% and 5% has been tested. The R-square value is 0.133 , p- value of F – statistic is .009 which is significant at 1% level . So we can say the model 4 is fit for the study. On the other hand coefficient value for the predictor variable is .030 which is positive and also significant at 5% level as the p- value of the coefficient is 0.039.

Table - 10 (model 6)

Variabl es	No. Of observat ion	Coeffici ent	Std. Erro r	T - statist ic	P - value	F - stat istic	P - value of f- statist ic	R - squa re
PFIDO B	100	.549	.225	2.443	.016*	4.064	.004*	.146
FS	100	.043	.013	3.209	.002*			
FAGE	100	.005	.001	.096	.924			
LEV	100	.013	.030	.428	.670			
(CONST ANT)	100	-.396	.175	-2.263	.026*			

Source : Author's own tabulation using SPSS 20 software

Dependent Variable: CG (** significant @ 5% , * significant @ 1% significance level)

Table 10 disclosed the result of our regression model 6. Significance at 1% and 5% has been checked . The R-square value is 0.146 , p- value of F – statistic is .004 which is significant at 1% level . So we can say the model 4 is fit for the study. On the other hand coefficient value for the predictor variable is .549 which is positive and also significant at 5% level as the p-value of the coefficient is 0.016.

Interpretation:

Proportion of Female director on board (PFDOB) has no significant association with the corporate financial performance (CFP) as regression Model 1(Table 5) having a coefficient value 0.506 , p-value is 0.166 and t-value is 1.395. Hence , we accept the 1st null hypothesis (H01) . This portray with the increase in proportion of female director on board , the corporate financial performance has no proneness to be better. On the other hand the control variables that is firm size and firm age has a positive coalition with the corporate financial performance and it is statistically significant at 1% level and leverage is statistically significant at 5% level. The above model demonstrates that the performance of the company will increase with board size. This may be because two brains are more effective than one. The efficacy of the board's operation and strategic resolution-making will increase as the number of directors increases, which will subsequently refine the performance of the company.

In our study Table 6 also explain the same facts in line with Table 5. Total Female director on board (TFDOB) has no significant link with the corporate financial performance (CFP) as regression Model 2 having a coefficient value 0.004 , p-value is 0.897 and t-value is -.130 . Hence , we accept the 2nd null hypothesis (H02) . This portray with the increase in total no. of female director on board , the corporate financial performance has no inclination to be better. On the other hand the control variables that is firm size and firm age has a positive alliance with the Corporate Financial gig and it is statistically significant at 1% level and leverage is statistically significant at 5% level.

To validate the results of the first-two models, we run a robustness check Model 3 using a different proxy, viz. proportion of female independent director on board (PFIDOB), measuring gender diversity on boardrooms. The findings of our study revealed that regression Model 3 which is in Table 7 explain a different results . Proportion of female independent director on board (PFIDOB) has statistically significant definite association with the corporate financial performance (CFP) as regression Model 3 having a coefficient value 1.078 , p-value is 0.022 (significant at 5% level) and t-value is 2.324 . Hence , the 3rd null hypothesis (H03) is declined and alternative hypothesis is accepted . This portray with the rise in total no. of female director on board , the corporate financial gig has inclination to be better. The control variables that is firm size (significant at 1% level) and firm age (significant at 5% level) also has a positive union with the Corporate Financial performance and it is statistically significant but leverage has no significant collision on corporate financial performance.

The above Models depicts that large board size is not always good for the corporate financial performance as proportion of female director on board and total female director on board (TFDOB) have a negative impact. But proportion of female independent director on board (PFIDOB) has a positive impact on the corporate financial performance . Consequently, it can be inferred from the aforementioned bits of evidence that the success of the company is affected by the proportion of independent female directors on the board. This may be due to freedom which a an independent director can exercise. added no. of female independent directors on the board, the more will be the effective operation and deliberate decision-making and in turn, will lean to amplify the firm's performance. More leverage leans to improve the firm's performance, which may be explained by the fact that it necessitates using more debt in the capital structure. Also, it will result in tax savings.

We also find from our study that proportion of female director on board (PFDOB) has statistically significant association with the corporate growth (CG) as regression Model 4(Table 8) having a coefficient value 0.366 , p-value is 0.038 (significant at 5% level) and t-value is 1.395. Hence , we

reject the 4th null hypothesis (H04) . On the other hand the control variables that is firm size also has a positive association with the corporate growth and it is statistically significant at 1% level, but firm age and leverage shows no significant relationship with corporate growth. Again we can find from our study that Model 5 (Table 9) disclose the similar result in line with Model 4 i.e. total no. of female director on board (TFDOB) and proportion of female independent director on board (PFIDOB) showing a positive statistically significant impact on corporate growth but the control variables namely leverage and firm age having no significant impact on corporate growth. So the null hypothesis H05 is rejected and alternative hypothesis is accepted.

To validate the outcomes of the first-two models, we run a robustness check (Model 6) using a different proxy, viz. proportion of female independent director on board (PFIDOB), measuring gender diversity on boardrooms. It also shows a similar result like Model 4 & 5. So null hypothesis H06 is rejected and alternative hypothesis is accepted .

As a result, it can be inferred from the aforementioned slivers of evidence that the corporate growth will likely improve with an increase in the gender diversity on board. The rational explanation for this finding is that female directors, in comparison to male directors, are better at improving managerial responsibilities through meeting preparation, a unique point of view, and leadership abilities. They thereby promote and enhance the financial performance of corporations. In terms of the control factors, FS positively and significantly affects the financial performance of corporations. FAGE and LEV, on the other hand, appear to have a considerable and detrimental impact on the financial performance of corporations.

Conclusion:

The results of this investigation have important practical ramifications. The results of this study will be beneficial to society and corporate decision-makers alike. Furthermore, we trust that the foundation of gender diversity allocation for corporate boards, particularly in a male-influenced nation like India, will not only improve corporate performance but also the level of

women in the corporate world and help create a more equitable society. This belief is based on empirical evidence, including this manuscript. One of the potential drivers of improved company performance corporate growth and reputation is seen to be gender diversity in boardrooms. The ground of this study was to look into how gender diversity on boards affects corporate financial performance and corporate growth in India. The top twenty NSE-listed Indian companies throughout a five-year period, from 2016–17 to 2021–2022, have been chosen as a sample. After adjusting for the upshots of firm size, firm age, and leverage, the results of the multiple regression analysis show that board gender diversity exerts a favourable and substantial influence in explaining corporate growth. The results of this investigation have important practical ramifications. Moreover, after adjusting for the effects of firm size, firm age, and leverage, the results reveal a positive and significant impact of board gender diversity on corporate growth. These uncovering suggest that board gender diversity is crucial to achieving business growth as well as enhancing corporate financial performance in India. The results of this inspect will be beneficial to society and corporate decision-makers alike. Furthermore, we think that the initiation of gender diversity allocation for corporate boards, particularly in a male-influenced nation like India, will not only improve corporate performance but also the level of women in the corporate world and help create a equitable society. This belief is based on empirical evidence, including this manuscript.

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