IS *VIRUDDHA* THE ONLY *HETVĀBHĀSA* IN *NYĀYA* PHILOSOPHY?

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No specific definition of *hetvābhāsa* was given by Goutama, the propounder of *Nyāya* Philosophy, in *Nyāyasūtra*. If we explain the meaning of the word *hetvābhāsa*- it is just a word which appears as a *hetu* but it doesn't work as *hetu*. Specifically, we can say that *hetvābhāsa* means invalid *hetu*. There are five characteristics of a proper *hetu*. Those are- *pakṣa-sattva, sapakṣa-sattva, bipakṣāsattva, asatpratipakṣatva, avādhitattva*. In this context, it is important to explain these five characteristics. Here *pakṣa-sattva* means *hetu* has to be present in *pakṣa.* Example- there is smoke in the hill. *Sapakṣa-sattva* means *hetu* must be present in *sapakṣa*, which is already pre-established. Example- there is smoke in the kitchen, which is already known by everyone. *Bipakṣāsattva* means *hetu* must not be present in *bipakṣa.* Example- there is no smoke in the lake. *Asatpratipakṣatva* means there must not be any other *hetu* which is equally potential with that particular *hetu.* Example- there is no *hetu* which is equally potential with smoke to prove fire in the hill. *Avādhitattva* means the absence of *sādhya* is not proved before this by any other *hetu* in *pakṣa.* Example- the absence of fire is not proved before by any *hetu* in the hill. If one of those characteristics is not present in a *hetu* then it must be considered as *hetvābhāsa*. According to *Nyāyasūtra* there are five kinds of *hetvābhāsa*. "*Savyabhicāra-Viruddha-Prakaraṇasama-Sādhyasama-Kālātītā-Hetvābhāsaḥ.*" 4/45 (*Nyāyasūtra*)[1] So, they are- (i) *Savyabhicāra* or *Anaikāntika*, (ii) *Viruddha*, (iii) *Prakaraṇasama* or *satpratipakṣa*, (iv) *Sādhyasama* or *Asiddha* and (v) *Kālātīta* or *Vādhita*.

According to the *bhāṣya*, "*Hetulakṣaṇābhābādahetabo hetusāmānyāt hetubadābhāsamānāḥ.*"[2] It means, *hetvābhāsa* appears like a *hetu* and it has so many similarities with *hetu* but five characteristics of proper *hetu* is not present in *hetvābhāsa*. If we analyse the word *hetvābhāsa* it will be "*hetorābhāsā doṣā hetvābhāsaḥ"*. So, the five

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[1] *Nyāyadarśana* (1), Pg- 390.

[2] *Nyāyadarśana* (1), Pg- 390.

fallacies of *hetu* are known as *hetvābhāsa.* Now I will discuss the problem what I have already raised in the title of this discussion.

As per the title of my presentation firstly we need to discuss about the definition of second kind of *hetvābhāsa* which is called *Viruddha hetvābhāsa*.

Definition of *Viruddha Hetvābhāsa*- "*Siddhāntamavyupetya tadvirodhī Viruddhaḥ*". 6/47 (*Nyāyasūtra*)[3]. That means, in an inference the *hetu* or the middle term contradicts the ultimate conclusion. For an example, 'Air is heavy because it is empty.' Here, 'air' is *pakṣa* or the minor term, 'heavy' (heaviness) is *sādhya* or the major term and 'empty' (emptiness) is *hetu* or the middle term. Generally, *hetu* proves the existence of *sādhya* in *pakṣa*. But in this inference emptiness is contradictory because it disproves the heaviness of the air. Thus, the contradictory middle or *viruddha hetvābhāsa* is one which disproves the proposition, which is meant to prove.

Now we will discuss some examples of other kinds of *hetvābhāsa*. So that we can show each and every example will come under one *hetvābhāsa* as well as *viruddha hetvābhāsa* as per its definition.

1. Example of *Savyabhicāra hetvābhāsa*- This is the first kind of *hetvābhāsa*. "*Anaikāntikaḥ savyabhicāraḥ*." 5/46 (*Nyāyasūtra*)[4] Example- 'Swans are rational because they are bipeds.' Here 'swan' is *pakṣa*, 'rational' (rationality) is *sādhya* and 'biped' (being a biped) is *hetu*. *Hetu* biped is related to both rational and non-rational creatures. In reality we all know that swans are not rational. Here also *hetu* disproves the conclusion.

2. Example of *Prakaraṇasama hetvābhāsa*- This is the third kind of *hetvābhāsa*. "*Yasmāt prakaraṇacintā sa nirnayārthamapadiṣṭaḥ prakaraṇasamaḥ*." 7/48 (*Nyāyasūtra*)[5] There are two positions. Example-

1st position- 'Sound is eternal because it is audible.' Here, 'sound' is *pakṣa*, 'eternal' (eternity) is *sādhya* and 'audible' (audibility) is *hetu*.

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[3] *Nyāyadarśana* (1), Pg- 400.

[4] *Nyāyadarśana* (1), Pg- 393.

[5] *Nyāyadarśana* (1), Pg- 405.

2nd position- 'Sound is non-eternal because it is produced.' Here, 'sound' is *pakṣa*, 'non-eternal' (non-eternity) is *sādhya* and 'produced' is *hetu*.

In one *pakṣa* two opposite kind of *sādhya* cannot be proved by two equally potential *hetu*s. We can see that, there are two opposite positions and both of the *hetu*s are equally potential to establish these two conclusions. But if sound is audible then it must be ⊣[non-eternal] and if sound is produced (one kind of quality) it must be ⊣[eternal]. So, the 1st *hetu* disproves the 2nd conclusion and the 2nd *hetu* disproves the 1st conclusion. Finally, the summary is *hetu* disproves the conclusion.

3.   Example of *Sādhyasama hetvābhāsa*- This is the fourth kind of *hetvābhāsa*. "*Sādhyāviśiṣṭaḥ sādhyatvāt sādhyasamaḥ.*" 8/49 (*Nyāyasūtra*)[6] Example- 'Sound is non-eternal because it is visible.' Here, 'sound' is *pakṣa*, 'non-eternal' (non-eternity) is *sādhya* and 'visible' (visibility) is *hetu*. We know that visibility never proves non-eternity of sound. Because sound can never be visible it must be audible. So, audibility is the characteristic of sound. Here also *hetu* fails to prove the conclusion.

4.   Example of *Kālātīta hetvābhāsa*- This is the fifth kind of *hetvābhāsa*. "*Kālātyayāpadiṣṭaḥ kālātītaḥ.*" 9/50 (*Nyāyasūtra*)[7] Example- 'Fire is cold because it is a substance.' Here 'fire' is *pakṣa*, 'cold' (coldness) is *sādhya* and 'substance' is *hetu*. The existence of hotness is perceived in fire through our tactual sense organ. So, there is no existence of coldness in fire. Here we have to reject the *hetu* because it has failed to prove the conclusion or the *sādhya* in *pakṣa*.

In this definition of *Viruddha hetvābhāsa* we can see that *Viruddhatva* is the highest universal here and all *hetvābhāsas* come under it. They are called *Savyabhicāra hetvābhāsa* as *Savyabhicāra viruddha hetvābhāsa*, *Prakaraṇasama hetvābhāsa* as *Prakaraṇasama viruddha hetvābhāsa*, *Sādhyasama hetvābhāsa* as *Sādhyasama viruddha hetvābhāsa* and *Kālātīta hetvābhāsa* as *Kālātīta viruddha hetvābhāsa*. The common thing in all these *hetvābhāsas* is the *hetu* contradicts the conclusion or fails to prove the conclusion.

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[6] *Nyāyadarśana* (1), Pg- 413.

[7] *Nyāyadarśana* (1), Pg- 426.

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Revised Definition of *Viruddha Hetvābhāsa*- Now the question is, is *viruddha* the only fallacy of inference? The answer is, if we follow the previous definition of *viruddha hetvābhāsa* then yes, *viruddha* is the only fallacy of inference and other *hetvābhāsas* come under it. But later the definition of *viruddha hetvābhāsa* had been changed. That is- "*Sādhyāvābavyaptaḥ hetuḥ Viruddhaḥ.*"[8] Which means, if *hetu* doesn't establish the *sādhya* in *pakṣa* and at the same time that *hetu* establishes the absence of *sādhya* in *pakṣa* then the *hetu* must be known as *viruddha hetvābhāsa*. For an example, 'Sound is eternal because it is produced.' The *hetu* 'produced' doesn't establish 'eternity' in 'sound' but it establishes 'non-eternity' in sound. So, the term 'produced' is not a valid *hetu*, it is called *viruddha hetvābhāsa*. According to this definition of *viruddha hetvābhāsa*, it is not the only fallacy of inference. But here we have to remember one thing that the previous definition is also very important because it helps us to reach the proper definition of *viruddha hetvābhāsa*.

There are many differences among these five kinds of *hetvābhāsa*. Now we will discuss this briefly. The *savyabhicāra hetu* or the irregular middle is found to lead to no one single conclusion, but to different opposite conclusions. This fallacy occurs when the ostensible middle term violets the general rule of inference, namely, that it must be related to the major term, or that the major term must be present in all cases in which the middle is present. The irregular middle is not uniformly concomitant with the major term. It is related to both the existence and the non-existence of the major term. So, it is also called *anaikāntika* or an inconstant concomitant of the major term. The *viruddha* or the contradictory middle happens when the ostensible middle term, instead of proving the existence of the major, in the minor, which is intended by it, proves its non-existence therein. The distinction between the *savyabhicāra* and the *viruddha* is that while the former only fails to prove the conclusion, the latter disproves it or proves the contradictory proposition. The *satpratipakṣa* or the inferentially contradicted middle arises when the ostensible middle term of an inference is validly contradicted by other middle term which proves the non-existence of the major term of the first inference. The difference between the *viruddha* and the *satpratipakṣa* is that, while in the former the middle itself proves the contradictory of its conclusion, in the latter the contradictory of the conclusion is proved by another inference based on another middle term. The *sādhyasama* or the unproved middle is one which is not yet proved, but requires to be

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[8] *Tarkasaṁgraha,* Pg- 416.

proved, like the major term or *sādhya*. This means that the *sādhyasama* middle is not a proved or an established fact, but an *asiddha* or unproved assumption. The fallacy of the *asiddha* occurs when the middle term is wrongly assumed in any of the premises, and so cannot be taken to prove the truth of the conclusion. The *kālātīta* or the non-inferentially contradicted middle is the ostensible middle term of an inference, the non-existence of whose major is ascertained by means of some other source of knowledge. The fallacy of *satpratipakṣa* is different from the fallacy of *kālātīta* or *vādhita,* because in the former one inference is contradicted by perception or some other non-inferential source of knowledge. [9]

Now we can conclude in this way, in Indian logic, a material fallacy is technically called *hetvābhāsa,* a word which literally means a *hetu* or reason which appears as, but really is not a valid reason. The fallacies of inference in Indian logic are all material fallacies. So far as the logical form of inference is concerned, it is the same for all inferences. There is, strictly speaking, no fallacious form of inference in logic since all inferences must be put one or other of the valid forms. Hence if there is any fallacy of inference, that must be due to the material conditions on which the truth of the constituent premises depends. The material fallacies being ultimately due to such fallacious reasons, the *Nāiyāyikas* consider all these as being cases of *hetvābhāsa.* So, there are five different kinds of material fallacy or *hetvābhāsa, viruddha* is not the only one.

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