LANGUAGE AND ITS STRUCTURE: A COMPARATIVE DISCUSSION FOLLOWING LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AND *TARKASAṀGRAHA*

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There is an inseparable relation among the world, thought and language. We can know about that from both Western and Indian Philosophy. In Indian Philosophy, specially the *Nyāya* school has admitted four kinds of cognitions and the four instrument or the means of cognition or *pramāṇa* - perception or *pratyakṣa,* inference or *anumāna,* camparison or upamāna and testimony or śabda[1]. Testimony or *śābdo-bodha* is comprehended by the *śabda*. The neo *naiyāyika Annaṁbhaṭṭa* said in his *Tarkasaṁgraha* - "an authoritative person's (*āpta*) statement is *śabda*"[2]. A person who has the actual knowledge of the objects,who can perceive objects as they exist in nature, who is not deceitful and whose five sense organs are perfect, called a trust-worthy person.

The statement of this trust-worthy person is testimony. These statements are nothing but the collection of some meaningful words or *pada.* Now what is word or *pada?* "*shaktam padam"*[3] means which has the power or *śakti* to indicate some objects is called word. Here the power means to signify some objects or *artha.* A particular term denotes a particular object. Not any term denotes any object. If a word has the power or *śakti* to signify an object then that very special word can denote a special object. Now what is *śakti* or powerof a word? *Annaṁbhaṭṭa* has described *śakti* or power as God's will or *Īśvarecchā* in *Tarkasaṁgraha* [4]. He said, " ... *Īśvara-saṃketa śakti*".[5] Sometimes human beings also christen objects. That is why *Annaṁbhaṭṭa* said that the both the wills of God and Human being are *śakti* but the will of God converts into the will of human being. Besides, *Annaṁbhaṭṭa* said that the power of a word is nothing but the relation between word and the object it signifies that is *pada-padārtha-saṁbandha*, in *Tarkasaṁgraha-dīpikā* . If anyone is aware regarding the relation between word and its significant then he can comprehend the cognition by testimony.

There are various ways of learning this *pada-padārtha-saṁbandha.* But the practice of experienced persons or *vṛddha-vyavahāra* is the most acceptable one for a learner, viz. children and sophisticated person.[6] i.e. a boy noticed that an elder person uttered "Bringthe cow" in front of another elder person. Having listened this, second elder person brings an animal in response. The boy

observes that before the utterance this activity does not happen. Then the boy concludes that the activity is the result of the utterance. He concludesit by the agreement in presence and agreement in absence (*anvaya-vyatireka*). Nonetheless the boy does not know 'cow' and 'bring' which word denotes which thing.

Again, the boy observes that the first elder person utters "Bring the horse and bind the cow". Having listened the statement, the latter one brings a new animal and binds the previous animal. Now the boy understood the meaning of the words or the power of the word— 'cow', 'horse', 'bring', 'bind' etc. by collection or *āvāpa* and rejection or *udvāpa*[7].

Now the question is that has the '*pada-padārtha-saṁbandha* always a direct sense? *Annaṁbhaṭṭa* said that there is an indirect sense too which is called "*lakṣaṇā*". If we do not understand the direct signifying power (*sākṣāt-saṁbandhafi*)[8] or *śakti* of a word then wecan understand it by the help of '*lakṣaṇā*' or indirect signifying power (*paraṁparā- saṁbandhafi*)[9]. According to *Annaṁbhaṭṭa*, *lakṣaṇā* is the relation to a *śakya* (*śakya- saṁbandhafi hi lakṣaṇā*)[10]. If the direct significance of a word could not be understood then the nearest meaning of the term is understood indirectly by *lakṣaṇā.* For example, "*Ga ṅgāyāṃ ghoṣafi*" means 'The milkmen's hamlet is in the *Gaṅgā*'. Here the direct sense or the *śakti* of the word "*Gaṅgā*" denotes a river. But a hamlet could not be situated on streamof a river. That is why the direct sense of the term has been abandoned. And the *lakṣyārtha* of the term has been accepted instead of *śakyārtha. Lakṣyārtha* of the term "*Gaṅgā*" is the bank of the river where the milkmen's hamlet can be situated.

There are three kinds of *lakṣaṇā* admitted by *Annaṁbhaṭṭa* in *Tarkasaṁgraha.* They are: a)

Jahal- lakṣaṇā, b) *a-jahal- lakṣaṇā*, c) *Jahat-ajahal- lakṣaṇā.*

a) In *Jahal- lakṣaṇā*, the direct sense or *śakyārtha* of a word is fully excluded (*Jahat*). For example, *"Mañcāfi krośanti"[11]* or "The platforms are shouting". Platforms are inert objects, so they could not shout. Here '*mañcāfi*' or 'Platform' indicates the audience sitting on the platform are shouting and this is the indirect significance or *lakṣaṇā* of the word '*mañcāfi*'.

b) In *a-jahal- lakṣaṇā*, the direct significance or *vachyartha* is not wholly excluded (*a- jahat)*, rather *vācyārtha* is included (*anvay)* to comprehend the meaning of a statement. For example, "*chatriṇafi gachanti*" or "The people with parasols arepassing".[12] Here the "*chatriṇafi*" does not indicate only those people who are carrying umbrella, as well as it indicates those people who are not carrying umbrella.So, "*chatriṇafi*" indicates a group of people most of them using umbrella. So, we can see that the *vācyārtha* of the term '*chatriṇafi*' has not been excluded,

rather it includes the direct significance too.

c) In *jahat-ajahal- lakṣaṇā*, *vācyārtha* of a term has been partially excluded and partially included. i.e. "*tat tvam asi*" or "That art thou".[13] Here 'That' means *Brahma* and 'thou' means *jivātmā*. According to *vedāntins* '*tat*' and '*tvam*' are identical because both are conscious. But *jivātmā* is limited by space and time and *Brahma* is limitless. From this point of view they are not identical. Here the *śakyārtha* of the terms '*tat*' and '*tvam*' have been included and the characteristic of *Brahma* and *jivātmā,* such as limited, limitless, almighty, less powerful etc. have been excluded. This is *jahat-ajahl- lakṣaṇā*. So, according to *Annaṁbhaṭṭa*, we can understand the meaning of a word by *śakti* or *lakṣaṇā.* There is no other way to comprehend a statement without understanding the *pada-padārtha-saṁbandha*

Gauṇīvṛtti or secondary sense [14] of a word is another way to comprehend a statement admitted by *Mīmāṁsaka.* They said that when the direct sense and indirect sense of a word fail to signify a significant, then *gauṇīvṛtti* works. Viz. "*agnifi māṇavakafi"* or "the young scholar is fire".[15] The young scholar is a human being so he could not be fire or a burning object. Here the direct sense of the word 'fire' has been abandoned. Indirect signifying power of the word 'fire' is 'purity', 'brightness'. Here is an indirect relation to the properties of the word 'fire' with the word '*māṇavaka'*. It is not *lakṣaṇā,* it is a new kind of *vṛtti, gauṇīvṛtti*. But *Annaṁbhaṭṭa* said that as the *gaunivritti* is a kind of indirect sense of a word, for *lāghava* it is included in *lakṣaṇā.*

Now, does every word have its *vācyārtha?* It means will a statement be understood only in the basis of *pada-padārtha-saṁbandha?* Then how can we understand the meaning of a poem, experience, feelings etc. where the *pada-padārtha-saṁbandha* does not work actively? The followers of '*Dhvani*'-school of Indian Poetics admitted the suggestive power or *vyañjanā*[16] to solve this problem, although *Annaṁbhaṭṭa* did not admit this *vyañjanā* According to him this suggestive power is defined by *anumāna*, so it is *anyathāsiddha*. *Annaṁbhaṭṭa* said that the acceptance of *vyañjanā* is unnecessary while *śakti* and *lakṣaṇā* can solve the problem.

One noticeable thing is whether we always comprehend the meaning of a statement by the *pada-padārtha-saṁbandha* or is there any other way to understand the meaning of a statement? According to the opinion of *Naiyāyika* if we always follow this relation then we will be confined in the structural world of this *pada-padārtha-saṁbandha*. Allusion, gesture etc. have meanings also. We can understand the meaning of indication, allusion. There is no word and its significant exists in the case of allusion or gesture. We can comprehend the meanings of experiences, feelings etc. nonetheless no

word and its significant exist in those cases also. Poetry, verse etc. have their own meaning and we can understand those meanings and there is no such *pada-padārtha-saṁbandha* and not every term of the poetry or verse indicates any object. If we would like to find out every object related to every word using in the poetry then the original thought or the actual meaning of them will be lost.Now, shall we follow this structure of *pada-padārtha-saṁbandha* or should we transgress this structure and shall give importance to our feelings, experience as well?

We have already discussed the doctrine of the '*Dvani*' - school of Indian Poetics. They said that if we admit the feelings, emotions of anyone then we must admit the suggestive power or *vyañjanā* of a word. The role of *vyañjanā* in poetics is irrefutable.

Western analytic philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein's doctrine is very much relevant in this connection. Wittgenstein admitted that our thought is expressed through our language and our language is related to our real world. So, our thought is related to our world, it is a transitive relation. In his famous book "Tractatus Logico Philosophicus", Wittgenstein tried to describe this relation. At the very beginning of 'Tractatus', Wittgenstein said **"The worldis the totality of facts..."[17] (TLC 1.1)**. To explain the fact he again said **"A fact is the existence of states of affairs." (TLC 2)[18]** And to describe a state of affairs, he said **"A state ofaffairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things)." (TLC 2.01)[19]** according to Wittgenstein, **"The sum-total of reality is the world." (TLC 2.063)** Wittgenstein did not try to exemplify the objects, rather described its features.[20] These are as follows:

1. Objects are simple (TLC 2.02)

2. Things are independent in so far as they can occur in all possible situations, but this form of independence is a form of connexion with states of affairs, a form of dependence. (TLC 2.0122)

3. Objects contain the possibility of all situations. (TLC 2.014)

4. Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent. (TLC 2.0271)

5. Every object has external (material property) and internal property (formal property) (TLC 2.01231)

6. Objects can only be named, cannot be describable (TLC 3.221)

So, these are the basic characteristic of an object. The reality is expressed through propositions. Facts, state of affairs are described by propositions. Propositions are composited by elementary proposition. An elementary proposition is constructed by names. An elementary proposition describes

an atomic state of affair and a name indicates an object. Though objects are logical atoms of world but they are not independent or describable solely. Objects exist as a constituent of state of affairs and this is why they can only be named.

Wittgenstein said that the world, thought and language is related to each other. Thought regarding world is expressed through proposition. Propositions are a collection of meaningful names. An elementary proposition is constructed by names. These names denote objects. Names cannot describe anything but indicate objects only. Nonetheless, meaningful names construct elementary proposition which describes an atomic state of affair and some elementary proposition construct a complex proposition which describes facts or world. So, there is simple object in world corresponds to a name and there is a relation between name and object as like *pada-padārtha-saṁbandha* described by *Naiyāyikas.* According to *Naiyāyikas* this *pada-padārtha-saṁbandha* is determined by the will of God or *śakti (Īśvarecchā śakti).* But according Wittgenstein, such kind of relation is totally arbitrary. *Annaṁbhaṭṭa* said that not any word denotes any object, it must have the power or *śakti)*to signify an object. Besides, a collection of meaningful words cannot be called sentence. There must be three conditions to comprehend a statement, which are- *Ākāṃkṣā, yogyatā* and *sannidhi.* [21] *Ākāṃkṣā* means the dependency between words which yield the awareness to understand a statement.[22] *Yogyatā* means the compatibility betweenwords for understanding the statement. *Sannidhi* means the utterance of words without delay. So, these three pre-conditions are essential for *śābda-bodha.* Similarly, Wittgenstein said that we have to know the compatibility of objects in a state of affair. Thus, the sum totalof names or a statement can describe a fact. It means we are to know the internal properties or logical form of an object so that we can know the possible occurrences of an object in situations as well as.[23] (**TLC- 2.0123, 2.01231**) Once we know this, we can understand on which occurrence it will not be eligible to fit. Thus, we can get the idea of logical space[24] (**TLC- 2.013**) with the help of this logical form of an object. After that we shall be able to conceive the idea that how does a statement depict the world and how does a name work?

According to Wittgenstein, for a child or a beginner ostensive definition is very important. Because they do not know which word refers which thing? They are learnt by showing the thing i.e. "This is a cow". In this manner a child comprehends the relation between signifier- significant.

Wittgenstein has shown that a statement depicts a reality like a picture. A picture is similar with its significant unlike there is no such similarity between a statement and its significant. Rather a described situation of a statement is always conforming to a statement. A statement depicts the objects

of reality outside it. It means statement is the mental picture of a statement. We can visualize the reality by hearing a statement. That is why the relation of a statement and its significant is called pictorial relationship by Wittgenstein- "A picture is a model of reality" (**TLC-2.12**).[25]

So, there is a formal structure has been admitted by Wittgenstein and *Naiyāyikas* to explain the relation between language and reality. A word signifies it's significant or a name signifies an object in both the cases. Now the question is that couldn't we comprehend a statement without following this formal structure of *pada-padārtha-saṁbandha* or name-object relation? Could we transgress this structure?

In his **Philosophical Investigation,** Wittgenstein rejected the subject matter of Tractatus. He transgressed the so-called relationship between name and object or signifier-significant in Philosophical Investigation. He said in **Investigation** that it is impossible to find out every significant of every name. If we try to do so, the meaning of a sentence will be lost sometimes. i.e. *"mamāpi janma tatraiva, bhūyāt yatra gato' bhavān"*[26] a wife said this to her husband who was going somewhere without taking his wife with him. The meaning of this sentence according to *pada-padārtha-saṁbandha* is that, the wife will be born where her husband will go. But the suggestive meaning of this statement is that, if the husband will go somewhere abandoning his wife, she will be died because she could not bear the separation. So, if we always follow the *pada-padārtha-saṁbandha* or name-object relation, then the actual meaning of a statement will be lost some time, the '*Dhvani'* - school of Indian Poetics also said the same thing regarding *vyañjanā* or suggestive meaning of a statement. Not only that, sometimes we cannot find the consequent object of an abstract name or it is difficult to indicate any past or future object by their names. Besides 'this', 'here' these words have not any consequent object. There are so many words in our colloquial language and they do not appraise any object at all.[27] So, we have to find out the usage of words.[28]

Wittgenstein said that it is not the case that we can comprehend the meaning of sentence by the appraisement of the signifier-significant relation. Then how will a statement be comprehensible? To solve this problem Wittgenstein introduced the 'Language-game theory' in **Investigation.**[29]

Wittgenstein said that there is no common rule among different type of games, nevertheless they all are called 'game'. There is no common rule for every game. Similarly, there is no rule for language as well as the usage of language, i.e. the formal structure of *pada-padārtha-saṁbandha* or name-object relation. So, what is common among different type of games or language is **family resemblance**.[30] According to Wittgenstein, the usage of language is the meaning of a statement, i.e.

when a mason constructs a building with his helper then the mason asks for bricks, cement, they have their own usage of language. Similarly, when a doctor asks for a knife, scissors etc. from his assistants in an operation theatre, they have followed their own usage of language.[31] So, in these cases they do not follow any structure of language, nonetheless they can communicate with each other. So, the usage of language is more important than the structure.

According to Wittgenstein language is not only the sum total of words and their relations ina statement or some formal structure, but also the medium of communication, expression, work. There are many usages of language, like, asking question, making jokes, telling a story, congratulating someone, describing something etc.[32] Communication is very essential forour living life, our everyday life or it is a part of our everyday work. If we confine ourselves into the structure of word-object relation or - *pada-padārtha-saṁbandha* then our life will be stagnant. Even we don't need any word to communicate sometime, we can communicate just through allusion, griffin etc. So, the usage of language or communication is depended on our everyday life, our living life.

At the end of the discussion, we can see that our experience, feelings are valuable as well as language in our life. If we do not transgress the formal structure *of - pada-padārtha- saṁbandha* or name-word relation we have to ignore our feelings, experience. On the otherhand, and if we can transgress this structure then following both the views of '*Dhvani'-* school of Indian Poetics and Wittgenstein, we must admit that comprehension of a statement is based on the usage of language, feelings and living experience of our life.

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