

IS SENSE OBJECT CONTACT ESSENTIAL FOR PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE?

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I

Perception is usually defined as *indriyārtha sannikarṣotpannaṃ jñānam*—knowledge arising out of contact between sense organ on the one hand and object on the other. By sense organ meant any one of the external sense organs like eye, ear, tongue, nose and touch and also internal sense organ like manas. By object is meant external objects like jar, cloth etc. And also, internal objects like pleasure, pain etc. What is to be noted in this connection is that there is a direct contact between an external object and external sense organ in the cause of external perception. But manas is also present there because without its participation no knowledge takes place. Again, there must be contact between manas and *atmā* because knowledge is a quality of *atmā* or self. In other words, *atmāh manah samyoga* is as essential in knowledge as *indriya manah samyoga* and *indriya viṣaya samyoga*. Although these three are essential in perceptual knowledge, only *indriya viṣaya samyoga* is simply mentioned leaving aside the other two because it is the extra ordinary cause (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*) of perceptual knowledge. The truth of the matter is that *atmāh manah samyoga* and *manah indriya samyoga* are common to every kind of knowledge. Only *indriya viṣaya samyoga* is the specific cause of perception. Further, the contact that takes place in perception between sense organ and the object is any one of the six different types like *samyoga*, *samyukta samavāya*, *samyukta samaveta samavāya*, *samavāya*, *samabeta samavāya*, and *viśeṣya viśeṣaṇa bhāva*. In the perception of a substance by means of visual or tactual sense organ, we have *samyoga sannikarṣa*. The eyes or hands come in contact with an object, say jar, as a result of which the jar is perceived. But in the perception of a quality belonging to a substance, we have a different type of contact. In the perception of a red jar *guṇaviśiṣṭa* is *dravya* for example, our sense organs visual or factual come in contact with the object jar, where James is

present in the relation of *samavāya*. Similarly, in the perception of *guṇatva*, the contact that takes place is known as *saṃyukta samaveta samavāya*. The sense organ comes in contact with the object where *guṇa* is present in the relation of *samavāya* and *guṇatva* is present in *guṇa* in the relation of *samavāya*. Thus, we have *saṃyukta samaveta samavāya sannikarṣa*.

Likewise, in the perception of sound through ear, we have *samavāya sannikarṣa*. For sound is a quality of *ākāśa* which is present in the meatus or ear-whole in the relation of *samavāya*. Similarly, in the perception of soundness, we have *samabeta samavāya sannikarṣa*. For *śabdatva* is present in *śabda* in the relation of inherence or *samavāya* and *śabda* is also present in the ear-hole in the relation of *samavāya*. In the perception of *samavāya* and *abhāva viśeṣya viśeṣaṇa bhāva sannikarṣa* is admitted. The sense organ comes in the contact with the *adhikaraṇa* or locus which stands for *viśeṣya* in this case and *abhāva* which stands for *viśeṣaṇa*, characterizes the object under consideration. Two points are worth noticing here, in the first place who do not admit the reality of *samavāya* do not accept *sannikarṣa* as six. For then, *sannikarṣa* can be of three different varieties like *samavāya*, *saṃyukta tādātmya* and *saṃyukta tādātmya tādātmya*. Secondly, those who do not admit the possibility of the perception of *abhāva*, do not accept the possibility of *viśeṣya viśeṣaṇa bhāva sannikarṣa*. Instead, they admit the possibility of another *pramaṇa* known as *anupalabdhi* to account for absence or *abhāva*.

Be that as it may, some sort of contact is to be admitted in order to account for perception. The *Naiyāyikas*, the champions of clarify in thinking and expression, go to the length of suggesting that this contact in perception may assume two forms *laukika* and *alaukika* i.e., ordinary and extra ordinary. The six types of contact mentioned before are ordinary. But some extra ordinary types of contact are to be taken into consideration for the explanation of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa jñānalakṣaṇa* and *yogaja* perception. We perceive, for example, all the members of a class through the knowledge of class property or *sāmānya*. When we perceive a cow, we also perceive cowness which is a class property of

cow. Thus far we have ordinary perception. Our visual sense organs come in conjunction with a cow where the property of cowness is present in the relation of inherence. In short, the *sannikarṣa* that takes place is *saṃyukta samavāya*. But we do not stop here. Through the perception of cowness present in a particular cow, we extend the domain of our perception. We perceive all the member of a cow—past, present and further through the knowledge of cowness for cowness is a property belonging to all the cows. Here the knowledge of *sāmānya* or universal acts as medium of contact and hence the name. In *jñānalakṣaṇa* perception, an unusual contact takes place between the sense organ and the object, generally, a particular sense organ is capable of grasping a particular type of object. For example, visual sense organ can grasp colour, but not sound etc. An auditory sense organ can grasp sound, but not colour etc. That a particular sense organ is associated with a particular object (called *viśaya vyāvasthā*) is due to the reason that a particular *indriya* which is capable of grasping a particular object is composed of that element of the object. For example, a visual sense organ can grasp colour because it is composed of *teja* (fire) which is a property of *rupa* when this usual contact between the sense organ and the object is broken and a unusual contact between there takes place. We have what is called *jñānalakṣaṇa* perception when, for example, we perceive fragrance of sandalwood through visual sense organ, the unusual contact between fragrance (which is amenable to nose) and visual sense organ (which is incapable of perceiving fragrance because the latter is not a property of the former takes place). The reason behind this unusual contact is this. When in the past we perceived the fragrance of the sandalwood through nose, we also perceived the colour, texture, shape etc. of the sandalwood through eyes. These two perceptions get mixed up and become complicated in such a way that whenever we see the sandalwood the memory of fragrance arises. The memory of the past fragrance gets dislocated in time and space and senses as a contact have yielding the visual perception of fragrance of the sandalwood. Similarly, the *yogins* also acquire some extra ordinary power through

the practice of yoga to perceive distant objects, minute objects and the like. What is important to note is that perception cannot take place without some contact, whether ordinary or extra ordinary.

II

This theory of sense-object contacts in perception as essential is challenged by some outstanding philosophers belonging to Samkhya Bauddha, Advaita and even by although unbelievable, Navya Nyāya camps. The Samkhya philosophers look upon *pramāṇa* as a kind of *cittavṛtti*. By *citta*, Samkhya understands *manas*, *buddhi* and *ahaṃkāra* and these are all unconscious. The consciousness of *puruṣa* gets reflected in *antahkaraṇa* or *citta*. As a result, *antahkaraṇa* appears to the conscious, though it is really not conscious. This *antahkaraṇa* which is lying inside turns outward towards object and assumes the form of an object. *Antahkaraṇa* which is formless becomes bound by the object. As a result, *antahkaraṇa* turns out to be identical with the object. This identification of the inside *antahkaraṇa* with the outside object is called *pauruṣeya vodha*. Thus, *pramāṇa* stands for *pauruṣeya vodha* which is due to the merger of *citta* with its *vṛtti*, i.e., *viśayākār pariṇāti*. According to Samkhya, this type of *cittavṛtti* may be of three different types. Accordingly, we have three different types of *pramanas* known as *dr̥ṣṭa*, *anumāna* and *āptavacana*. All the other types of *pramāṇas* recognized in other systems can be successfully reduced to, and explained by, the above three just mentioned. What is important to note is that the *Samkhyains* avoid the use of the word *pratyakṣa*, perhaps because this word has direct reference to *akṣa* or *indriya*. In fact, they prefer the word *dr̥ṣṭa* which they define as *prativiṣaya adhyāvaśaya dr̥ṣṭam*. Here the word *dr̥ṣṭam* stands for *lakṣya* whereas the rest (i.e., *prativiṣaya adhyāvaśaya*) for *lakṣaṇa*. The purpose of definition is to differentiate the *lakṣya vastu* from *alākṣya vastu* and this is done with reference to *asādhāraṇa dharma* which serves as a *lakṣaṇa* or defining character. Vacaspati Misra rightly observes that the purpose of *lakṣaṇa* is to distinguish it both *samānajātiya* and *asamānajātiya*.¹ *Anumāna* etc. are to be viewed as *samānajātiya* with *dr̥ṣṭa* for

¹ *Samānasamānajātiya-vyvacchedo lakṣanārthah*, p-45 *Samkhyatattva Kaumudi*, Ed. By Narayan Chandra Goswami

all of them are *cittavṛtti*-s. On the other hand, *viṣaya* like *ghata*, *pata* etc. are to be viewed as *asamānajātiya* with *drsta* because the objects themselves are not *cittavṛtis*. So, the *drṣta cittavṛtti* (which is *lakṣya* here) is to be distinguished both from *anumāna*, *āptavacana* (which are also *cittavṛtti*, and stand on the same footing with *drasta*, hence *samānajātiya*) on the one hand and from objects like *ghata*, *pata* etc. (which are not *samānajātiya* with *drasta*) on the other. It is to be borne in mind that *cittavṛiti* arises out of amalgamation of *citta* with *viṣaya* no doubt. But this *cittavṛiti* is internal as its *aśraya* or locus is *citta*. But *viṣaya* in that sense is not an *antara padārtha* like *cittavṛiti*. However, Vacaspati explains that *drṣta cittavṛiti* is different from both *anumāna* etc., and *viṣaya* as well. In order to do so, he first of all concentrates on *viṣaya* which is derived from the root 'sing' with a prefix 'Be' and a suffix 'ach' in the nominative case-ending (*Bi+sing+ach* in *Katrvacya*). The root 'sing' means to bind. Hence the word 'viṣaya' means that which binds in a definite way. Thus, *viṣaya* binds *viṣayī* which is nothing but *antahkarana- viṣayī -nam ānuvadhuti*. As *antahkarana* is formless, *viṣaya* binds it in its own form *svena rupena nirupaniyam kurvanti*. It is to be noted that *viṣaya* may be of different types external like *ghata* etc. and internal like *sukha* etc. Whatever be nature of *viṣaya*, *antahkarana* must get related to *viṣaya* without which no *antakaranavṛtti* results or takes place. Hence Vacaspati Misra rightly remarks: *Viṣayain Viṣayain Prati Vartate iti Prativṣayain*.² The term '*adhyāvaṣaya*' means definite a certain knowledge. Such Knowledge arises as a result of direct relationship of *antakaranavṛiti* with *viṣaya*. According to *Samkhya*, such *antakaranavṛiti* is *acetana* or unconscious because it is transformation of *antahkarana* in the form of *viṣaya*. *Antahkarana* is unconscious. Yet it assumes the form of consciousness because reflection of conscious *Puruṣa* falls upon it. It is to be borne in mind here that reflection of consciousness into *antahkarana* is admitted by Vacaspati. But *Vijñānaviṣṭu* and others speak of double reflection theory-consciousness not only gets reflected in *antahkarana* but *antahkarana* in its form gets reflected in consciousness as well. As a result,

² *Ibid.* p-46

katṛtvābhimān of *puruṣa* along with *caitanyaābhimān* of *prakṛti* takes place. It is truth, *puruṣa* being formless cannot be *kartā* or agent, just *prakṛti* being unconscious in nature cannot be *cetana* or conscious. Yet *prakṛti* takes, herself to be *cetana* just as *puruṣa* takes himself to be *kartā* or agent. This *abhimānikā jñāna* is due to the double reflection theory. Be that as it may, the word ‘*prati*’ used in the definition of *drstā* demarcates it from *anumāna* and *smṛtijñāna*. In the case of *anumāna*, no direct relationship is established between *hetu* (say, *dhuma*) and *sādhyā* (say, *vahni*). But in the case of *drstā*, direct relationship is established between past object and a past observer. But in the case of *drsta*, direct relationship between present object and a past observer is beyond question. The significance of the terms ‘*viṣaya*’ occurring in the definition of *drstā* is to differentiate it from error (*Viparyaya*); for the *viṣaya* of erroneous knowledge is *asat* or unreal, whereas the *viṣaya* of *drsta* is certain (*Niścita*). The word ‘*adhyāvasāya*’ is used to defer *saṃśaya*(doubt) from the domain of *drsta* on the ground that the former is *aniścita* (uncertain). However, the *Samkhya* view of *drsta* not make any reference to *indriya* or *sannikarṣa*.

III

The Buddhist also do not subscribe to the view of perception originating from sense object contact. For them, perception is the immediate knowledge of the object free from imagination and error³. By imagination or *kalpanā* they mean employment of words to designate the object perceived. The underline suggestion is that when we perceive something ‘blue’ it is directly apprehended without a corresponding expression ‘its blue’. Designation by words comes later. An unknown bird or flower is capable of being perceived although it is not expressible in words. The *Naiyāyikas* seem to agree with this view. For, they also hold that words are not unfailing attendant of the object perceived. Had it been so, perceptual knowledge could not be distinguished from verbal knowledge. What is important to note here is that the *Nyāya* view differs from the Buddhist view in two respects, whenever we

³ *Kalpanāpodam abhāntam pratyakṣa, Nyābindu*

perceive the Naiyāyikas believe there is an object of perception and the object is a substance (*dravya*) like *ghata*, *pata* etc. or a qualified substance (*guṇaviśiṣṭa-dravya*) like *nila ghata*, *rakta pata* etc. the Buddhist on the contrary believe that we perceive, not a substance but a quality. For them substance is nothing other than the sum-total of qualities. That is why they claim that what we perceive is blue, red, etc. Secondly, the Buddhists believe only in the primary awareness of something without a corresponding name etc, as real or true. This type of perception is known as *nirvikalpaka* or indeterminate perception as there is no *vikalpa* or *kalpanā* associated with it. *Kalpanā*, according to Buddhist may assume five different forms like, *Nama-kalpanā*, *drava-kalpanā*, *guṇa-kalpanā*, *kriyā-kalpanā* and *jāti-kalpanā*. *Kalpanā* is defined as *abhilāp-samsargayogya pratibhāsa pratiti*. The first appearance of an object without any qualification by name, universal etc. (*nāmjṭāyadi yojanā rahita*) veridical perception. The subsequent mention of the object by object by name etc, vitiates the true nature of the object. This type of perception is *savikalpaka* as it is designated by word. This type of perception is not acceptable to the Buddhist as real. The Naiyāyikas, however, admit both types of perception—indeterminate which is nonverbal or *aśābda* and determinate which is verbal. Incidentally it may be noted in passing that the grammarians don't admit any perception which is not expressible in word they believe *śabda* as internal and equates it with *Brahmin* or reality. Hence, anything falls short of *śabda* is not admissible. The *Samkhya-s*, the *Mimāṃsakas*, the *Vedāntins* believe in both forms perception but their interpretations differ from one another. It may be noted in this connection that two noted commentators on Buddhist's philosophy differ regarding the exact meaning of *kalpanāpodam*. According to *Vinitdeb*, this epithet means *sangi*, i.e., object named to designate *pratyakṣa* as something named or nameable does not reveal the exact nature of *pratyakṣa* which is a name or *sangā*. That is why *Dharmottara* regards *pratyakṣa* as *sddesya* or subject and *kalpanāpoda* as *Vidhaya* or predicate. For he believes that it is by means of the predicate the nature of subject is clearly expressed. It may be objected that *kalpanā* being itself a piece of knowledge cannot added with or here of another

piece of knowledge. To avoid complication, *kalpanāpodam* is to be understood, in the sense of *kalpanāsvābhavarahita*. This means knowledge not affected by any kind of *kalpanā*. However, it is to be borne in mind that, *kalpanāpodatva* alone does not make knowledge real. When we go by boat, we see the trees on land as moving. This knowledge is clear or *sphuta*. Yet this knowledge is not real as the trees are developed of any motion. Similarly, some person inferring from some defects in their eyesight look upon one moon as two. Their knowledge of double moon is clear no doubt, although not real. That is why the epithet *abhrānta* is needed besides *kalpanāpoda*. *Abhrānta* means free from error, i.e., correspondence of knowledge with facts, actual state of affairs. The fact here is that there are static trees; but we have knowledge of moving dynamic trees the fact is that there is one moon; yet we have knowledge of double moon. Thus, there arises a discrepancy between knowledge and fact, giving rise to illusion or error. This error occurs nor may occur due so four reasons known as *indriyagata*, *viṣayagata*, *sthānagata* and *śariragata*. The perception of double moon is due to defect in eye-sight known as *timira roga*. Thus, this error occurs due to defects in sense organ. Error due to object occurs when a particular *masāla* (torch) gives rise to the knowledge of *alatacakra* owing to rapid rotation of *masāla*. The static trees appear as dynamic when viewed from the running boat. This is due to spatial reason. Error arising out of bodily reasons is due to the disability in the body out of the preponderance of *vayu* or *pitta* or *śleṣma* over others. It is not perhaps out of place to mention that Dinnag is not willing so include *abhrānta* in the definition of *pratyakṣa*. For, he believes that error creeps in knowledge when we add words to it. Moreover, he is not prepared to admit any reality of the external object beyond the domain of knowledge. As a result, not question of correspondence between knowledge and external object does appear. In other words, perception must be indeterminate in character and whatever is indeterminate must be free from error. Indeterminate knowledge is knowledge without characterization by language. Hence there is no need to add a redundant epithet *abhrānta* to knowledge. Perceptual knowledge worth the name must be free from error of any kind. It

may be asked: why then Dharmakīrti does propose the inclusion of *abhrānta* in the definition of perception? Two plausible answers may be put forward to account for this. In the first place, Dharmakīrti represent the *Sautrāntika* schools of Buddhism. The philosophers belonging to this school believe in the external reality of the object along with internal reality of knowledge. As these philosophers are *sarvastivādis*, they want to exclude such conditions in perception which may vitiate perception. Secondly, it may be said that the necessity of using these two epithets rest on refuting the views of opponents either from the side of the Buddhist or from the side of non-Buddhist. It should be noted further that if we use the word *abhrānta* in the sense of *avisamvādaka jñāna*, as envisaged by Kamalāsīla in his *Tattvasaṃgraha*, then a compromise can be achieved between *Dharmakīrti* and *Dinnaga*. Any student of Buddhist philosophy knows that *avisamvādaka jñāna* has the properties of *pradarsakatva* (revelation of the object), and *pravartakatva* (movement towards the object) and *prapakatva* (getting the object). Thus, every *avisamvādaka jñāna* must be free from error. For, it only reveals the object but helps us receive the objects also. If the knowledge which reveals the object does not lead to successful activity i.e., does not help us getting hold of the object it cannot be regarded *avisamvādaka jñāna*.

IV

The most damaging criticism of the sense-object-contact theory is perhaps received from the Advaitins. They not only not adhere to the above view but also remarks that such view cannot escape from twin difficulties of *ativāpti* and *avāpti*. If, perception, is defined in terms of sense object contact, then the definition will be subject to *ativāpti doṣā*. For, in that case other type of knowledge like *anumāna* etc. will come under the *pratyakṣa*. Every knowledge is due to *mānas* or *manojanya*. *Anumāna* being a knowledge also due to the intervention of *mānas*. Hence perception will be applicable to *anumāna* also, as the latter also arising out contact between *mānas* and *viṣay*. Again, the Nyāya definition of is subject to *avāpti doṣā* as well, for it does not cover the perception of God. It is

held in Śruti that God perceives everything even though he is devoid of sense organs⁴. Thus, the determinant of *pratyakṣa* cannot be *indriyajanyatva*. The question may naturally arise, if cannot be properly defined in terms of sense object stimulation what should be its proper determinant? To such query the Advaitins reply that the use of *pratyakṣa* centres perception knowledge or *pratyakṣa pramā*. The instrument of *pratyakṣa pramā* is known as *pratyakṣa pramāna* and the object of *pratyakṣa pramā* is known as *prameya*. Of these three where the term *pratyakṣa* is used or capable of being used - *pramā*, *pramāna* and *prameya*—the identity between *pramāna caitanya* and *prameya caitanya* gives rise to *jñānagata pratyakṣa*; whereas the identity *pramāṭṛ caitanya* and *prameya caitanya* gives rise to *viśayagata pratyakṣa*. Although *caitanya* or consciousness is really one in nature, it assumes different forms in relation to *upādhi*. Thus, we have *pramāna caitanya*, *pramāna caitanya* and *prameya* or *viśaya caitanya*. Of the three, the relation of consciousness with objects like *ghata* etc. is known as *viśaya caitanya* or *prameya caitanya*. When consciousness gets associated with *antahkarana vṛtti* we have *pramāna caitanya*. By *vṛtti*, it is meant *visayākāra pramāna*. Just as water is carried to a field through canal and assumes the form of the field, similarly *antahakaraṇa* which is *taijasa* in nature goes out to the object through the *indriyas* and gets united with the object. This *visayākāra parināma* of *antahakaraṇa* is called *vṛtti*. Besides these two, we have also *pramāta-caitanya* arising out of *caitanya* delimited by *antahkarana*, i.e., *antahakaraṇāvacchinna caitanya*. This *antahakaraṇāvacchinna caitanya* is called *pramater caitanya*. What is important to note here is that in the case of perception *antahakaraṇa* goes out to the object, say *ghata*, and assumes the form of *ghata*, i.e., terms into *ghatadiviśayaka caitanya*. As *antahakaraṇa* has no form of its own, it assumes the form of the object to which it is united by going out. According to Advaitins what happens in such cases, *viśaya*, *ghata* and *ghatākār antahakaraṇa vṛtti* being places in the same place, both forms of consciousness get identified. Although *viśaya* and *antahakaraṇa vṛtti* are the limiters (*vibhājaka*) of

⁴ *Pasyati acaṅsu akarṇa*

caitanya, they are different from each other. Yet by their occupation of the same place, they remain identified at that time. In other words, they are not limited of *caitanya* at that time. This sort of knowledge is called perception of jar. But in the case of perception of pleasure, pain etc. which are internal objects, the question of *antahakaraṇa* going out does not occur at all. In such cases, *sukhādiviṣyāvaccinna caitanya* and *sukhādivṛṭtyāvaccinna caitanya* remain always in the same place being united with each other. That is why, knowledge of pleasure etc, is always perceptual. In the case of *porṣa jñāna* like *anumāna* etc, *antahakaraṇa* does not get a chance to go to *vahumi* and get united with it for the simple reason that the visual sense organ is not related to it. In fine, *pratyakṣa* according to *Advaitins*, is not to be defined in forms of sense object contact. It is to be defined as *jñānatvam pratyakṣatvam*.⁵ *Jñāna* according to *Advaitins*, is not only revealing the object; it is also revealing itself. This self-revealing character of knowledge needs no proof, as it self-evident. If there be knowledge, it must be revealed automatically or perceived naturally. *Jñāna* is comparable to light without which everything remains in the dark. That is why *jñāna* which is like light cannot be said to exist without being perceived. This is the nature of *jñāna*. *Sruti* also describes the nature of knowledge as *sakṣāt* and *aporokṣa*. According to *Advaitins*, consciousness which is eternal, unchangeable, part-less and indeterminate is alone real. It is *parāmārtha sat* and is always immediate (*aporokṣa*). Being eternal and part-less, consciousness cannot be perceived by means of *indriya*. It is object (*viśaya*) that is perceived or perceivable by *indriya* only. In the perception of *ghata*, there are two elements – *jñānamsa* and *viṣamsa*. The *jñānamsa* remain the same in every *viśiṣṭa jñāna*; it is the *viṣamsa* that changes from one knowledge to another. It is the *viśaya* that gives a form to knowledge which is itself formless. As a result, the infinite knowledge appears as finite in the form of object. The object is material, not self-luminous. It is the self-illuminating knowledge that makes the revelation of the object possible. Several points are worth noticing here. The *Advaitins* admit two types of perception

⁵ *Vedānta Paribhāṣā, Dharmarāj Adhvarindra, p-*

jñānagata and *viśayagata*. But regarding the order of these two types, *Advaitins* differ. According to *Vācaspati* and his followers, the *jñānagata pratyakṣa* precedes *viśayagata pratyakṣa*. The *vivaraṇa sampradāya*, on the other hand, go to the other extreme claiming the priority of *viśayagata pratyakṣa* over *jñānagata pratyakṣa*. *Dharmarāj* in this connection follows the line of *Vācaspati*. But he differs from *Vācaspati* in accepting *mānas* as an *indriya*. *Dharmarāj* argues that *mānas* has no definite object to receive like other external sense organs. Pleasure, pain etc. which are usually spoken of as the object of *mānas* are denied by *Advaitins*. According to them pleasure, pain etc. are *saṅśivedya*, i.e., objects of direct awareness of *saṅśin*. Moreover, if *mānas* were *indriya* in the time sense, it could not have been auxiliary (*sahakāri*) to other senses. Further, there is no proof for admitting *mānas* as an *indriya*. To take resort to *Gītāvsāya*— *manah-ṣaṣṭhānīndriyāṇi* or *indriyanāmi manascasmi* proof is not admissible. For the number six by which *mānas* is mentioned can be fulfilled by and extended to that which is not an *indriya*. In other words, *sankhya* or fulfilment of number does not indicate always that it is member of the same class. There is no such hard and fast rule. For example, in the expression of ‘*yajmāna pancama*’ where the sacrificial *habī* idea is asked to be eaten by *yajmāna* along with the four priests (*ṛtwika*)-*hosa*, *udgata*, *adhvarju* and *Brahma*. Here also the *panca saṅkhyā* belonging to *ṛtwika*-s is to be understood as *yajmāna* who is external so the list of *ṛtwika*-s. Narrating the different *vādhaka pramānas* against *mānas* as an *indriya* *Dharmarāj* finally mentions a *sādhaka pramāna* from *stuti* as well—*indriyāṇi parānyāhur-indrebhyaḥ paraṃ manah | manas-astu parā buddhir-yo buddheḥ paratas-tu saḥ*//.⁶ Lastly, if *pratyakṣatva* is defined in terms of *jñānatva*, *anumānāndi jñāna* seem to come under the purview of *pratyakṣa*, thereby giving rise to *ativyāpti doṣa*. The *Advaitins* solve this problem in the following manner. In the first place, in inferential knowledge like other pieces of knowledge, there are two parts – *jñānamsa* and *viśamsa*. The earlier part in inference is surely perceptual and on question of *ativyāpti* does arise here. In truth, *caitanya* or *jñāna*, according to

⁶ *Gītā*,3/42

Advaita, is *anādi* (eternal). Hence there can be no cause of it, truly speaking. But this eternal consciousness gets itself manifested in *antahkaraṇavṛtti* which is regarded as the *abhivyānjaka* (medium of manifestation). This *antahkaraṇavṛtti* is *sādi* (i.e., having a beginning) as it is produced by *indriya sannikarṣa* etc. As *caḥsurādi indriyas* are to be admitted as generating *antahkaraṇavṛtti*, they are secondarily designated as *jñāna* and *pramāṇa*. In other words, according to *Advaita Vedānta*, the perception of eternal consciousness is as good as the perception of jar. The difference between the two lies in the fact that the first one is primary (*mukhya*) while the second one is *gauṇa* (secondary) as it is *aropita* or *upacarita* (superimposed). In the former case there is no applicability of function of *indriyas*. The function of *indriyas* is notified only in the case of *janya pratyakṣa*. The last but not the least discordant note with sense-object-contact theory is traceable to some *Naiyāyikas*.

V

They counter successfully the Advaita objection to the sense object contact theory, propounded and indicated by the Ancient *Naiyāyikas*. They point out quite convincingly that the *Nyāya* argument of perception arising out of sense object stimulation is neither subject to *ativyāpti* nor *avyāpti doṣa*. In the first place, every knowledge is *manojanya* no doubt. But the *mānas* which is present in *anumānādi jñāna* serves not as *indriya* but as a property of *mānas*, i.e., *indriyatva* is a *karaṇa* of perceptual knowledge; but *mānas* as property of *indriya*, i.e., *indriyatva* is a *karaṇa* of perceptual knowledge; but *mānas* as property of *indriya*, is not a *karaṇa* of inferential and other non-perceptual knowledge. Hence the charge of *ativyāpti* brought about by the *Advaitins* does not pass master critical examination, secondly the charge of *ativyāpti* is wrongly levelled against the *Nyāya* view. The *Naiyāyikas* mention clearly that God's perception is not within the jurisdiction of their definition. This is evident from the explicit use of the word *upamāna* (produced) in the definition of perception as *indriyārtha sannikarṣotpannam jñānam*, God's perception is *nitya* or eternal; but human perception is *janya* or non-eternal.

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However, to get rid of the possibility of the above charges and also the desire to extend the definition of perception to both human and divine cases, Gangeśa, the founder of Navya Nyāya, define perception as *jñānakaraṇakam jñānam pratyakṣam*. Perception is a kind of knowledge which is not brought about by the instrumentality of any other knowledge to explain. In order to make inferential knowledge possible. We are to depend on three conditions, known as *paṅśadharmatā jñāna* (the presence of *hetu* in the *paṅśa* with certainly), *Vyāptijñāna* (the universal of concomitance of *hetu* with *sādhya*) and *parāmarśa jñāna* (arising out of the above two *jñānas* take together). So inferential knowledge is not *jñāna-akaraṇaka-jñāna* but *jñāna-karaṇaka-jñāna*. But perceptual knowledge which arises out of a contact between sense-organs and the object is *jñāna-akaraṇaka-jñāna*, for the sense-organs object and contact are all material or *jada*. In other words, none of them, is of the nature of consciousness, *jñāna svarupa*. Thus, perception is *jñāna-akaraṇaka-jñāna*, whereas inference etc. are all *jñāna-karaṇaka-jñāna*.

A little reflection will show that this definition is not acceptable. For, all perceptual knowledge cannot be regarded as *jñāna-akaraṇaka*. *Savikalpaka* perception, for example, is determined by *nirvikalpaka* perception. *Savikalpaka*, perception is an example of *viśiṣṭa buddhi* where *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa* are related to each other. In the perception like ‘this is jar’ (*ayam ghatah*), jar stands for *viśeṣya* and jariness stands for *viśeṣaṇa* and these two are related to each other by the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). *Viśiṣṭabuddhi* presupposes the knowledge of *viśeṣaṇa* which is supplied by *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* is brought about by *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* which is of the nature of *jñāna*. Thus, *savikalpaka* is *jñānakaraṇaka* and not *jñānakaraṇaka jñāna*. This position is not also enabled. For *nirvikalpaka jñāna* is not a case *viśiṣṭa buddhi* and therefore it is not characterizable either as a *pramā* or as an *apramā*. The term ‘*karaṇa*’ can be significantly used in relation to *pramā* only which *nirvikalpaka* is not. If it is argued further that a certain section of the *Naiyāyikas* look upon *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* as *pramā* then our reply would be that such knowledge too is brought about by

the knowledge and desire of God. *Iśwarecchā* and *Iśwariya jñāna* are regarded as common causes (*sādhāraṇa kāraṇa*) for all types of knowledge. So, no knowledge with the name is possible without *hāna*, *upādāna* or *upekṣa budhi* preceding it. In this sense all knowledge is *jñāna-karaṇaka* and *nirvikalpaka* being a specimen of knowledge is no exception, thus the definition of perception as *jñānakaraṇaka jñāna* does not appear as sound. This is the reason why later *Naiyāyikas* like *Viswanatha* resorts to *jātighatita lakṣaṇa* of *pratyakṣa*. In his *Muktāvali Saṃgraha*, *Viswanath* clarifies *yatkincit pratyakṣādikam adaya tat vyākti vṛtti anumityavṛtti jātimattvam pratyakṣatvādikam vaayamiti*. So, explain *pratyakṣa* is to be defined as one possessing *pratyakṣattva* (perceptionness) which is a *jāti* (universal) and which is present (*vṛtti*) in all types of non-perception like *anumiti* etc. It may not be out of place to mention that *Appay Dikshit* in his *Vitanda-Kalaturu-Parimal* define perception as *jñānyanya-jñāntvam jñānaprokṣyam iti nirvāktavyam*. This means that *pratyakṣa* is not due to any other knowledge. It is to be accepted as *aprokṣa* or immediate. This definition has got a striking resemblance with the *Navya Nyaya* definition. But this definition to appears to be defective. When we perceive a person with a stick (*dandipurūṣa*), the stick appears as a *Viśeṣaṇa* (adjective). For without the knowledge of *danda* characterising the person as *dandi*. So, the perception of *dandi* is *jñāna-yanya-jñāna* and not *jñānajanya jñān*. In order to remove this defect, it is held that though *dandi* is due to the knowledge of *danda*, yet this *danda* is also a part and parcel of *pratyakṣa*. In other words, *danda* is also a part and parcel of *pratyakṣa* that is why, it is not *svaviṣay-arisayaka*.

However, the opinion of *Appay Dikshit* is directed to counter the view of *Vivaraṇa Prasthāna* which we have mentioned earlier. While the followers of *Bhāmati* proceed from *Kāraṇa* to *Kārya*, the followers of *Vivaraṇa* go to the opposite direction, proceeding from *Kārya* to *Kāraṇa*.

VI

Let us now turn so critical examination of the views which avoid reference to sense object contact, the *Samkhya* philosophers use the term '*dr̥śha*' in place of seems to be this that the word

'*pratyakṣa*' is more related to sense-object-contact theory than '*dṛṣṭā*'. The term '*aḥṣa*' which means sense organ refers to the rival view more directly. Instead, *dṛṣṭā* means direct apprehension or cognition without referring to sense organ. But a closer examiner of Samkhya view reminds us that it is not free from traditional view sense object contact. The Samkhya philosophers consciously do not use the term *indriya* and *sannikarṣa*. But they cannot the term *viṣaya* and *dṛṣṭā*, according to them, is certain knowledge of the object-*prativiṣaya adhyāvaśāya*. The term *protiviṣaya* occurring in the definition of *dṛṣṭā* is explain by Vācaspati as *viṣayam viṣayain prati vartate iti prativiṣayam*. This means that *prativiṣaya* stands for something which is directed (*vṛtti*) to the object. Thus, by *vṛtti* Vācaspati means *sannikarṣa* or contact. *Vṛttisca Sannikarṣa*. Now this *sannikarṣa* which takes place around every object is not possible without *indriya*. Hence *indriya* turns out to be the real meaning of *prativiṣaya*. '*Adhyāvasaya*' means certain knowledge which can take place when there is a contact between the sense organ and the object. Out of this sort contact between the two, *antahkaraṇa* assumes the form of the object. This is known *viṣayākār parinām* of *antahkaraṇa*. This *antahkaraṇa vṛtti* which itself is unconscious assumes the form of consciousness owing to the reflection of *puruṣa* on it. This shows that Samkhya cannot altogether overcome the influence of traditional thinkers.

To the Buddhists view of perception as *kalpanāpodam* (free from imagination) and *abhrāntam* (free from error), it can be safely held that they are not against sense-object-contact. They are simply against employment of words about what is perceived through the contact between the sense organ and the object. Their ever seen to the use of language about what is seen is due to the fact that error creeps in through language. That perception arising out of sense object contact is admissible to them is evident from classification of perception into *indriya jñāna*. By *indriya jñāna* meant *indriasya jñānam* (knowledge through sense organ). Whatever to meaning, knowledge through sense-organ is not denied. What is denied by them is the description and designation by language of that which is obtained through sense-organ. The Buddhist also accept another type of perception known as

manovijñāna. In the ninth sutra of Nyāyabindu, Dharmakīrti defines *manovijñāna* as *svaviśaya-anantara viśayasahakāriṇa- indriyajñānena-samānāntara pratyena janitam that manovijñānam*. *Manovijñāna* arises after *indriyajñāna* and this is expressed by *svaviśaya antara*. The second type of perception arises immediately after *indriyajñāna*. But the second type is like the previous one, not identical with it. What happens in such cases is that the first knowledge leaves behind a similar type of knowledge, called *samānāntarajñāna* before destruction, Thus, a series is formed known as *jñāna-dhāra*. In this *jñāna-dhāra*, the preceding knowledge is the *upādāna* of the subsequent knowledge known as *upādeya*. Thus, *indriyajñānam* is taken to be *upādānajñāna* of *manovijñāna* hence the characteristic of *manovijñāna* are: (1) It arises out of *indriyajñāna*; (2) its object is *samānajātiya* (similar, not same) to the object of previous knowledge, i.e., *indriyajñāna* and (3) they are both specimens of the same stream—*dhāra* or *prabhā*. It follows from the above that *manovijñāna* is not possible without *indriyajñāna* as the former arises out of the latter. Hence sense object-contact is admissible even at the stage of *manovijñāna*. Besides these two types of perceptions, the Buddhist speak of others two varieties of perception known as *ātmasaṃvedan* and *yogijñāna* we are not concerned with the elaborations or explanation of this types. What we are concerned with is that any type of perception worth the name must be immediate and direct. That does not mean that there is no sense-object contact there. What is important for them is that this direct cognition is not expressible in words. For Buddhist, every knowledge is momentary and perception is no expression. How can a momentary knowledge be divisible into four verities is something to be pondered about? Incidentally, the Samkhya philosophers don't take the trouble of classifying *dr̥ṣṭā* at all. Nor any reason provided. It is for the scholar to give a satisfactory explanation so this silence.

Admitting the Advaita position that *indriya* is not a determinate of *pratyakṣa*, yet the Advaitins can't deny that empirical perception of jar etc. is due to *indriya* (*indriyajñāna*). For, *ghatādi pratyakṣa* is nothing but the limited manifestation of unlimited consciousness. It is same that consciousness is not

perceived or perceivable by any one of our sense organs. But it is also true that without relation to the sense organ the object which gives some form (*rupa*) to the formless consciousness that is why our perception is to be taken as *sakhanda abhivyākti* of *akhanda caitanya*. That is why the Advaitins maintain that it is the *antahkaraṇavṛtti* which is responsible for the, manifestation of object which was not known before. The function of *vṛtti* is to dispel concealment of material object which has got *ajñātasatta*. That which has no *ajñātasatta* (like *antahkaraṇa* and its *dharma sukhadukkha* etc. needs no *vrashi* to dispel ignorance. The Advaitins believe that the rise and fall of this *vṛtti* account for the rise and fall of consciousness. Thus, the two (*vṛtti* and *jñāna*) appear to be in-separately related and for this reason *vṛtti* is also regarded as *jnana* only secondarily. This sort of knowledge to *vṛtti* is *aupacarik* (accidental) and not natural (*svābhāvika*). Admitting this *vṛtti* to be a kind of knowledge *indriyas* etc. are also admitted to be *pramāna*, through the secondarily. As a matter of fact, the word admitted to be *pramāna*, through the secondarily. As a matter of fact, the word perception used and capable of being used in relation to *jnana* (known as *pramā*), the instrument of knowledge (known as *pramāna*) and the object of knowledge (known as *prameya*). In other words, the word *pratyakṣa* in our language stand for both *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa*. *Pratyakṣa* as *viśeṣya* means *pratyakṣa jñāna*, whereas the same *pratyakṣa* as *viśeṣaṇa* may mean (1) *pratyakṣa jñāna (idam pratyakṣa jñāna* (2) *pratyakṣa viśeṣya (ayam ghatah pratyakṣa)* and (3) *pratyakṣa pramāna (idam pratyakṣa pramānam)*. That is why sometimes object (*ghata- jñāna*) as primary. Accordingly, we have *viśayagata pratyakṣa* in the former case and *jñānagata pratyakṣa* in the latter whatever be the case, *antahkaraṇavṛtti* cannot occur without the participation of *indriya* though *indriya* is not directly related to knowledge it is directly related to *antahkaraṇavṛtti* which is in direct relation to knowledge in time consciousness which is itself formless becomes manifested in the form of *ghata, pata* etc. So, the *ghata-viśayaka- caitanya* is *sakhanda* not *akhanda*, *indriya jñāna*, not *ajanya*. In other words, in the manifestation of limitless consciousness in the form of finite limited object *caḥsurādi indriya* can very well be regarded as

cause. Further, the Advaitins also admit the direct perceptual knowledge of object arising out of *śabdajñāna* which is usually taken *parokṣa* not *pratyakṣa*. In the celebrated example of *daśamāstomi* (You are the tenth) the person counting immediately perceives himself to be the tenth man. Although this knowledge is due to the having of the above-mentioned knowledge is due to *vākya*, yet it's not *parokṣa* but *pratyakṣa*, for the tenth man knows himself directly through sense-object-contact. In this case, *vṛttivacchinna caitanya* get identified. That is why, if is case of *pratyakṣa* this also shows that sense object reference can't be altogether ignored. The Navya Nyaya tactical of replacing sense-object-contact by *jñana* —*akarṇakajñāna*—does not been scrutiny. We have already shown that *pratyakṣa* can't be properly set to be *jñāna akarṇaka savikalpaka pratyakṣa* is example only if we admit that sometimes of *aviśiṣṭa jñāna* logically preceded it. Again, no knowledge worth the name can take place the will and knowledge of God. This examples why *nirvikalpaka jñāna* is also *jñānakaraṇaka*. Further, *hānādi buddhi* determines our activity forwarded perceptual knowledge. So perceptual knowledge *jñānakaraṇaka*, even if for the sake of respect towards Gangeśa, if is admitted that perceptual knowledge is *jñānakaraṇaka*, if can't be denied that its *jñānakaraṇaka*. Gangeśa can't denied the perception of jar takes place when there is a contact between *indriya* and *artha*, hence perception is *indriya-artha-sannikarṣa*, *karaṇa* is the sense-organ, the object and the contact are all *jada* or material in nature. And they have some hands to play in the generation of perceptual knowledge. It may be reminded that the Navya-Naiyāyikas look upon *vyāpāra viśiṣṭa kāraṇa* as a *karana*. *Vyāpāra* for them, stands for something which being produced the effect. In the case of perceptual knowledge (which is the effect) *sannikarṣa* acts as *vyāpāra* or intervening cause. This *vyāpāra* is due to *indriya* which is called *vyāpāri* or *vyāpāra viśiṣṭa*. As for the Navya-Naiyāyikas *vyāpāra viśiṣṭa kāraṇa* is *karaṇa*, the sense organ is to be regarded as *karaṇa* of perceptual knowledge. It is evident from the above consideration that Navya-Naiyāyikas cannot set aside the role of sense organ in the generation of perceptual knowledge. That ancient *Naiyāyikas* accept the roles of *indriya*, *viśaya* and *sannikarṣa* is

beyond question. They, however, differ from the Navya-Naiyāyikas regarding the *karāṇa* of perceptual knowledge. According to them, it is the last in the causal series that has a special claim for the designation of *karāṇa*. For the production of effect is not delayed after its appearance. That is why the Ancient *Naiyāyikas* look upon *sannikarṣa* as the *karāṇa*. It is *phalāyogavyāvachhinna karāṇa* and hence *karāṇa*. The *phala* or the effect is perception of jar which is produced by the cooperation of more than one cause. A positive effect needs at least three causes for its generation. The *indriya* and *viṣaya* must be present along with *sannikarṣa* to give rise to the effect. But the *indriya* and the *viṣaya*, though present, cannot produce the effect. They are thus not directly related to the effect. As soon as contact takes place between *indriya* and *viṣaya* perception results immediately. Thus, *indriya* and *viṣaya* are *phalāyoga*, but *sannikarṣa* which is different (*vyāvanacchinna*) from the two above, produces the perceptual knowledge of the object. Thus, for the older *Naiyāyikas* it is the contact or *sannikarṣa* which has something special, that is why, *sannikarṣa* is to be regarded as *karāṇa* proper. *Annambhatta*, the author of *Tarkasaṃgraha*, does not fall in line either with traditional or modern view. In his *Dipikā*, he defines *asādhāraṇa karāṇa* as something different from *sādhāraṇa karāṇa*. *Sādhāraṇa karāṇa* is defined as one which is present before the production of any effect whatever. Space, Time, *Adṛṣṭa*, *Iswarecchā* etc. are viewed as common causes for any effect, be jar or a cloth. An *asādhāraṇa karāṇa* on the other hand, stands for a cause which is related to a particular type of effect. Jar, for example, is produced out of clay, the cloth from threads. They are therefore, *asādhāraṇa karāṇa* in respect of the effect produced. *Annambhatta*, who is known from his originality in thinking, warns us not to accept any one of the causes as *asādhāraṇa*. According to him, *karāṇa* is *sādhakatama*, i.e., most excellent of the causes. What is the most excellent cause? Ask Jayanta and answers, none in isolation, but all in conglomeration to explain. Suppose a traveler is passing through a road at dead of night. On a sudden flash of lightning, he perceives a woman in front of him passing through the road. Now Jayanta asks the question, what should be the most excellent cause in the

perception of the woman? Certainly, we are tempted to answer: it is the flash of lighting that helps the traveler perceive the woman ahead of him. In his natural characteristic with way, he remarks; Let there be light, but no woman. Can the traveler still perceive the woman? Certainly not. Let the woman be there and lightning as well, but no traveler. Who will then perceive the woman? The truth is that the perception of woman cannot take place in the absence of any one of the causes. That is why, no cause in isolation can be regarded as *sādhakatama*. But when all the cause are taken together, the effect is seen to be produced. Hence *sāmagri* or totality is to be taken as *sādhakatama kāraṇa* or *kāraṇa*. This *sādhakatama kāraṇa* is *pramāṇa* which Jayanta defines as *vodhāvodhasvabhāva sāmagri pramāṇam*. In other words, *sāmagri* is not a cluster of *vodha padārthas*(like conscious entities). *Sāmagri* is a mixture of both conscious and unconscious elements—*vodha* and *avodha* taken jointly. Thus, Jayanta makes a compromise as it were between two divergent views. What is important to note is that sense object reference cannot be dismissed altogether in the generation of perceptual knowledge. All philosophers agree on the immediacy (*sakṣātkāritva*) of perception but none can avoid mentioning sense organ, object and their contact for the explanation of perception.