

**EXTENSIONS, NUMBERS AND FREGE'S VISION OF LOGIC AS A  
UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE**

**Tapi Ansari**

**Abstract**

Frege famously employs the idea of 'extension' in his definition of number. Extensions, in the Fregean framework, are susceptible to bringing many difficulties, and, some say, even paradoxes. Therefore, neo-logicist programs want to avoid the problems and to replace the classical Fregean definition of number with Hume's Principle (where Frege does not use extensions). Even while this action makes sense computationally, I contend that it conflicts with Frege's greater philosophical endeavour. For Frege, I claim, extensions were an important part of his philosophical program of logic-as-an-universal-language. This is why Frege places his project in line with Leibniz' philosophical project of finding a lingua characterica universalis.

**Key Words:** Extensions, Frege, Language, Logic, Numbers